Author Archive | Jarrett

Hating your transit agency won’t make it better

P1010476The Vancouver metro area has now reached the climax of a frenzy of orchestrated rage directed at its transit agency, TransLink.  Over 60% of voters have rejected a sales tax increase for urgently needed transit growth, largely due to an effective campaign that made the transit agency's alleged incompetence the issue.  

There's just one problem.  TransLink is (or was) one of North America's most effective transit agencies.   Parts of the agency had made mistakes, and of course TransLink was struggling to meet exploding demand in one of the world's most desirable metro areas.  Almost nobody defends TransLink's governance model either.  But TransLink is, or was, an effective network, run by a reasonably efficient agency.  For years I cited it all over the world as a model for good planning.  Whether it remains that depends on how much of it is now destroyed in the thrill of recrimination.

Admittedly, I have a personal angle on this, because I worked inside TransLink's planning department for two long stints, for a year in 2005-6 and for six months in 2011.  (I have assisted them as a consultant since, but I have no contracts with TransLink now and no expectation of one.)  It was, I thought, an unusually forward-thinking and principle-driven transit planning department.  I assumed this was an expression of Metro Vancouver's unusual culture of intentional, strategic, controlled urban development. It also reflected an era of leadership that created the space for these thoughts to occur, as opposed to the crisis-by-crisis lifestyle that too often prevails in transit management.

The conversations that were happening at TransLink — especially about the difficult question of how a regional transit agency can form a reality-based relationship with its constituent cities — were extremely sophisticated and respectful.  How should a large regional agency interact with city governments when it holds the technical expertise about transit that city governments mostly lack? For example, when a city government demands something that is geometrically impossible, how can the transit agency's response avoid appearing overbearing?  Much of what I now know about this relationship, and the unavoidable forces operating on it, I figured out while helping with policy development there.  

Today, those issues are at the core of my practice, as the relationship between city governments and transit authorities becomes an urgent issue almost everywhere. 

Special-purpose regional governments are vulnerable creatures.  The marquee leaders of an urban region — usually major mayors and state/province leaders — influence them but don't control them directly enough to feel responsible for them.  Blame is easily shifted to them by the more powerful governments all around them.  

All this is even more true when the product is transit, for four reasons.

First, transit somehow looks easy, in a way that water and power and regional land use planning do not.  Many reporters have no factual frame for thinking about transit, and treat anyone with a simplistic answer as an expert.  (Tip: my book can help provide that frame.)

Second, transit's success is utterly dependent on municipal actions around land use and street design, so regional transit agencies that are thinking strategically must form an interest in those municipal decisions.  This is easily characterized as interference with municipal sovereignty.  (I always advise transit agencies to respect local right to make decisions but to clearly describe the transit consequences of those decisions, in advance.)

Third, everyone is now screaming at transit agencies to innovate, and yet voters have zero tolerance for risk.  Some of TransLink's failures are arguably innovations that didn't work out.  If you expect everything your agency does to be successful, then quit telling them to innovate, because failure is intrinsic to innovation.  

Fourth, transit, when considered in isolation as in Metro Vancouver's referendum, cannot avoid generating a ferocious difference in opinion across different parts of an urban region.  In any region, maps of votes on transit referenda are mostly maps of residential density (Vancouver, Seattle), and for good reason.  Transit demand rises exponentially with density: doubling density makes it more than twice as urgent.  So of course the average core city dweller views transit as existential while the average outer-suburbanite on a cul-de-sac views it as unimportant.  Giant regional transit agencies will continue to be pulled apart by these forces until we stop having regional transit debates and start having regional transportation debates.  (The other important trend, in response to this basic math, is that core cities must exert more leadership, and funding, on their own transit issues.  More on that below.)

What is amazing, then, is not that regional transit agencies are having political problems, but that so many of them are doing so well, considering.  Many regions are moving forward with strong regional transit strategies, supported by working majorities of voters.  Many are also making tough choices, like the painful shift in priorities that underlies Houston's new network.

Hating your transit agency is easy and fun.  You don't have to understand your regional politics, in which the real power to fix transit is usually not held by the transit agency.  You can also have the thrill of blowing up a big institutional edifice, as Metro Vancouver voters may now have done.

But a lot that's good will also be destroyed.   In Metro Vancouver, amid all the recriminations, TransLink has lost the credibility it needs to lead reality-based conversations about transit.  Maybe some other agency will step into that role.  (Indeed, core cities for whom transit is an existential issue must develop that capability.)  Or maybe there will just be many more years of blame shifting among the elected officials who really control transit in the region.

If you look at transit from the point of view of a state or province leader, you can understand why so many politicians are terrified of the issue.  Everyone is screaming at them about it, pushing simplistic solutions, and the issue is polarizing on urban-suburban lines.  Some huge problems, like equipment failures due to deferred maintenance, are curses laid upon us all by our parents' generation.  What's more, most elite leaders are motorists, and need help finding their feet in the geometric facts of transit where a motorists' assumptions lead them astray.  So they panic, shift blame, and leave transit agencies appearing to have more power to solve problems than they actually have.  If you've never been a political leader, don't be sure you wouldn't do the same in their place.

Be patient.  Breathe.  Resist the desire to see your transit agency in smoldering ruins.  Then, demand leadership.  Demand state/provincial leadership that looks for solutions instead of pointlessly stoking urban-suburban conflict.  (One possible solution is to spend more time on regional transportation debates instead of just transit debates, because regional transportation plans can look more balanced than transit plans can.)  And yes, if your transit agency is being given dysfunctional direction by the region's leaders, demand a better system with more accountability to an elected official who will have to answer for outcomes.

Finally, if you live in a major city that cares about transit, demand that your city leaders look beyond blaming the transit agency, and that they do everything they can themselves to make their transit better.  Remember, your city government, through its powers of land use planning and street design, controls transit at least as much as the transit agency does.  Ask them: What is their transit plan?  Tell them to follow the work of cities that are investing in transit themselves, beyond what their transit agency can afford, like Seattle and Washington DC., or for that matter transit-ambitious secondary cities like Bellevue, Washington, who have their own transit plans to guide the city's work.  No regional or state transit authority — beholden to state or regionwide government that is dominated by less urban interests — is going to meet all of the transit needs of a dense, core city that has chosen to make transit a foundation of its livability.  Their staff may well be doing what they can with the direction that they have, but they need your city government's active support, involvement, leadership, and investment.  

Sorry, transit is complicated.  It's fun to blow things up, as Metro Vancouver's voters probably have.  But the solutions are out there, if we all demand leadership, and offer it.

Why is US bus service shrinking as demand is rising?

This is so important!  Crosspost of an essay by Daniel Kay Hertz,  from the excellent City Observatory blog, where it was titled "Urban residents aren't abandoning buses: buses are abandoning them."  

 

“Pity the poor city bus,” writes Jacob Anbinder in an interesting essay at The Century Foundation’s website. Anbinder brings some of his own data to a finding that’s been bouncing around the web for a while: that even as American subways and light rail systems experience a renaissance across the country, bus ridership has been falling nationally since the start of the Great Recession.

But it’s not buses that are being abandoned. It’s bus riders.

The drop in bus ridership over the last several years has been mirrored by a decline in bus service, even as transit agencies have managed to resume increasing frequency and hours on all types of rail lines – heavy, light, and commuter.* (In this post, "service" means vehicle revenue miles – literally, multiplying a city's bus or rail vehicles by the number of miles they run on their routes.) After a post-recession low in 2011, by 2013 rail service had increased by over 4% nationally in urban areas of at least one million people. Light rail in particular has continued its decade-plus boom, with a service increase of more than 12% in just two years. By contrast, bus service – which already took a heavier hit in the first years of the recession – was cut an additional 5.8%.

Hertz 1 cutting back buses

  And it turns out that when you disaggregate the national data by urban area, there’s a very tight relationship between places that cut bus service between 2000 and 2013 and those that saw the largest drops in ridership. If you live in a city where bus service has been increased, it’s likely that your city has actually grown its bus ridership, despite the national trends. In other words, the problem doesn't seem to be that bus riders are deciding they’d rather just walk, bike, or take their city’s new light rail line. It’s that too many cities are cutting bus service to the point that people are giving up on them.

Hertz 2 more buses more riders

  Admittedly, this is a crude way to demonstrate a very complicated relationship. To rigorously test the impact of bus service on ridership, you’d want to take into account all sorts of other things: the presence of other transit services; population density; gas prices; demographics; and so on.

Fortunately, we don't have to do that, because researchers at San Jose State University’s Mineta Transportation Institute just did it for us. And they found that even if you control for those other factors, service levels are still the number one predictor of bus ridership.

Still, I can imagine two big objections to the idea that cuts to bus operations are behind ridership declines. First, a lot of cities have opened new rail lines since 2000 – many of which, if not most, replaced heavily-trafficked bus routes. In those cases, cities are adding rail service and reducing bus service, but it obviously wouldn’t be right to say that those bus riders are being abandoned.

But while that has surely happened in some places, it just doesn’t match the overall data. Rail service, including new lines, has been booming since long before the recession – but up until about 2009, bus service was growing, too, or at least holding steady. If rail expansions were driving bus cuts, you’d expect to see those cuts all the way back to the beginning of the data. But you don’t. Instead, cuts to bus routes appear right as transit funding was hit hard by the recession.

Second, you might argue that service and ridership are linked, but the other way around: as ridership declines, agencies cut back on hours and frequency to match demand. Teasing out which way the causation runs would be difficult – and the answer would almost certainly include at least some examples in both directions. One quick-and-dirty way to get an idea, though, is to compare ridership changes from one year to service changes in the next year. If agencies cut service because of earlier ridership declines, then you’d expect to see that places with larger drops in ridership in “Year One” tend to be the places with larger cuts to service in “Year Two.”

Hertz 3 bus cuts vs ridership

  But, again, they don’t. In fact, just 3% of the variation in service cuts is explained by ridership changes from the year before.

So while that’s hardly ironclad – and I look forward to further research that sheds more light on this problem – it does appear that a major part of the divergence in bus and rail ridership is a result of a divergence in bus and rail service: since the recession, transit agencies have cut bus service year after year, while returning service to rail relatively quickly.

Why did they do that? I don’t know. But I can speculate that it has something to do with the fact that bus transit supporters are not always the same kinds of people as rail transit supporters. Even though more people take buses than trains in nearly every metropolitan area in the country, train riders, on average, tend to be wealthier and whiter. Not only that, but many civic and business leaders who don’t use transit at all are heavily invested in rail service as an economic development catalyst for central city neighborhoods. In other words, rail tends to have a more politically powerful constituency behind it than buses.

As a result, when the recession blew a hole in transit budgets around the country, it may have been politically easier for local governments to fill those holes by sustaining cuts to bus lines, rather than rail.

To be clear, the problem here has nothing to do with whether transit agencies are running more services that are rubber-on-asphalt or steel-on-tracks. As Jarrett Walker has eloquently argued, the technology used by a particular line matters far less than the quality of service: how often it runs, how quickly, for how much of the day.

But there are at least two problems here. First, because of the spread-out nature of even relatively dense American cities, it will be a very, very long time before rail transit can connect truly large numbers of people to large numbers of jobs and amenities. When Minneapolis opened the 12-mile Blue Line light rail in 2004, for example, it was a major step forward for Twin Cities transit – but still, only 2% of the region’s population lived close enough to walk to one of the stations. For everyone else, transit still meant taking the bus, even if they were taking the bus to a train station.

And even in places with well-developed rail networks, those systems are usually oriented to serve downtown commuters. Especially in outer neighborhoods, crosstown trips in places like Chicago, Boston, or DC are heavily reliant on buses. Abandoning buses means abandoning those trips, and the people who depend on them.  

Boston's T reaches both Dorchester and Jamaica Plain, but a bus is by far the easiest way to get from one to the other on transit. Credit: Google Maps Boston's T reaches both Dorchester and Jamaica Plain, but a bus is by far the easiest way to get from one to the other on transit. Credit: Google Maps

Second, there are serious equity issues with shifting resources from bus to rail – again, not because of anything inherent to those technologies, but simply because of who happens to use them in modern American cities. In most cases, shifting funding from bus to rail means shifting funding from services disproportionately used by lower-income people to ones with with a stronger middle- and upper-middle-class constituency. And while transit ought to be viewed as much more than just a service for the poor, we can’t ignore the equity impacts of transit policy.

In light of all this, we have to stop talking about America’s bus woes as a ridership problem. All the evidence suggests that when service is strong, and buses are a reliable way to get to work, school, or the grocery store, people will take them. Instead, the problem is that fewer and fewer people have access to that kind of strong bus line. If we care about ridership, we need to restore and enhance the kind of transit services that people can rely on.

 

* “Heavy rail” includes traditional subways and elevated trains found in cities like New York, Washington, and Chicago. “Light rail” includes many newer systems, with smaller train sets that are sometimes designed to run on streets as well as in their own right of way. Rail lines in Seattle, the Twin Cities, and Dallas are typical of light rail. “Commuter rail” services generally reach from central business districts far out into the suburbs, and are meant almost exclusively for peak-hour workers.

Guest post: Driverless taxis, driverless buses, and the future urban mobility mix

Antonio Loro is an urban planner who focuses on the planning implications of emerging road vehicle automation technologies. He has conducted research with TransLink and Metrolinx on the potential impacts of automated vehicles, and is currently with the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario. This article was written by Antonio Loro in his personal capacity. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily represent the views of the previously mentioned organizations.

As efforts to develop automated vehicles continue to speed forward, researchers have begun to explore how driverless taxis in particular could play a prominent role in the future mix of urban transportation options. Some of these early findings raise the provocative argument that driverless taxis (or self-driving or fully-automated taxis, if you prefer) could hugely reduce or even eliminate the need for buses and trains. However, careful interpretation of this research reveals that vehicles with high passenger capacities (bus and rail transit, in other words) could be superseded by lower-capacity vehicles only where there is plenty of road space to spare. Where road lanes are in shorter supply, buses and trains – which could themselves get a huge productivity boost from automation – will continue to be indispensable for moving large volumes of passengers. In such cases, driverless taxis, especially share taxis, will be ideally suited to complement higher-capacity transit, generally by focusing on areas with a surplus of road space. And in the near-term, even before such advanced automation is perfected, automated buses could start improving mobility for large numbers of urban travelers.

Researchers have begun to explore future scenarios where vehicle automation technologies have advanced to a level that enables taxis to drive without human intervention through the full network of urban roads. Recently, the ITF (International Transport Forum), a think tank within the OECD, modeled a number of scenarios to examine how these driverless taxis, once they are commonplace, could serve urban travelers on a typical weekday in Lisbon. Among the outputs of their model, one is particularly attention-grabbing: even in a scenario where 8% of trips go by foot or bike, none go by transit, and the remaining 92% go by driverless taxis that serve single passengers, ITF researchers say that the number of taxis needed would be less than a quarter of the number of cars currently in use in the Portuguese capital. Such a reduction in the size of the overall fleet of cars in the city would greatly diminish parking demand. Unsurprisingly, though, in order to serve so many trips, the fleet of taxis would be used very intensively, and the total vehicle kilometres traveled (VKT) in the city would more than double.

Remarkably, the ITF team say that despite the upsurge in VKT in this scenario, travel times would be slowed very little. Underpinning this result is a noteworthy assumption in the model: currently, according to the ITF researchers, less than 40% of available capacity on Lisbon’s roads is in use during peak periods. (The authors caution that their figures are underestimates, as they do not account for bus travel, which makes up 13% of VKT in Lisbon.) The upshot is that even in a scenario where new taxi trips and empty taxis driving to their next passengers cause VKT to double, the ITF model’s outputs suggest  that there should be road capacity to spare.

The model shows the previously very lightly used local roads absorbing much of the new VKT. Meanwhile, the most heavily traveled category of roads (“local traffic distributor roads”) rises from 43% to 69% of road capacity used. That 69% doesn’t necessarily mean traffic will be flowing smoothly, however. These percentages refer to the average capacity in use on different categories of roads – even if there is a low percentage of capacity in use on a given category of road, there could nevertheless be congestion focused at some locations on those roads. Interestingly, according to the TomTom Traffic Index, congestion may already be an issue in Lisbon, as travel times during peak periods are currently 45% to 70% longer than they would be under free-flow conditions.

 The crucial implication to highlight here is that single-passenger driverless taxis could supplant buses and trains – but only where the roads have the capacity to absorb potentially huge increases in traffic without becoming congested.

A 2014 study by the Singapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology (SMART) arrived at results similar to those in the ITF study, though the SMART team modeled travel speeds in a much simpler way. The SMART researchers examined a scenario with single-passenger driverless taxis (or car-share vehicles) serving all trips in Singapore. They concluded that a fleet sized at one-third of the total number of passenger vehicles currently in use in the city could serve all trips while keeping peak period waiting times for the average passenger under 15 minutes. Such a dramatic result follows from a simplifying assumption in the model: the SMART team first estimated the current average speed that taxis drive at – including both the denser and the more dispersed areas of the city – and then assumed that future driverless taxis would drive at that particular speed, regardless of their location in the road network.

Less optimistically, the taxis would be bogged down in congestion of their own making. Currently in Singapore, 63% of peak period trips go via public transit. Shifting all of those trips to taxis would generate an abundance of new VKT – including VKT produced by empty taxis moving to their next passengers. Currently, peak period travel times on Singapore’s roads are 50% to 80% longer than they would be under free-flow conditions, according to TomTom; a massive increase in VKT wouldn’t help much. 

A more recent article from the SMART team includes a brief exploration of the congestion effects of empty taxis repositioning themselves in a very simple road network. They find that their algorithm generally results in the empty vehicles traveling mainly on less busy roads, though the repositioning process could cause heavy congestion in networks where there is already congestion. This preliminary analysis suggests that much of the traffic produced by driverless taxi repositioning could be focused on the roads that are least congested to begin with. This suggestion lines up with the results of the ITF team. Interestingly, the ITF’s model of Lisbon has the biggest increases in traffic showing up on local streets in particular – which could unfortunately make them less attractive places to live, the authors caution. Such streets serve purposes other than being conduits for cars – they may be quiet routes for walking and cycling, or safe places for children to play, or inviting public spaces, for example – so injecting new car traffic could produce impacts other than congestion that are worth considering. Furthermore, while the SMART team suggests that much of the traffic created by repositioning per se might be focused on the roads that were previously least congested, the taxis that are actually carrying passengers could of course be the more important source of congestion – especially when large mode shifts, such as those seen in the scenarios described above, inevitably produce large VKT increases.

The ability of automated vehicles to use roads more efficiently could mitigate congestion resulting from increased VKT – with some caveats. Combining automation and V2V (vehicle-to-vehicle communication) technologies would enable vehicles to drive safely with short following gaps. However, the large potential capacity increases resulting from this “platooning”, where vehicles are grouped into closely-packed files, would mainly materialize on freeways, where traffic flows are less turbulent than on city streets. Automation with V2V could also boost flows through intersections by coordinating the movements of vehicles far more efficiently than traffic signals. These improvements would be constrained, though, wherever intersections are shared with entities not equipped with the requisite tech – not just cars, but pedestrians and cyclists as well. More radically, vehicles themselves could be smaller, thus occupying less road space, if the crash avoidance capabilities of automation eliminate the need for bulky, crashworthy construction. However, such a revolution in vehicle design would not be able to take over the streets until automation technologies are advanced enough and adopted widely enough to guarantee occupant safety.

 The capacity limits of roads could be less of an impediment for multi-passenger driverless taxis. Hypothetically, if 8% of trips in Lisbon were taken on foot or bike and the remaining 92% were served by driverless taxis carrying multiple passengers (most commonly three to five, but as many as eight), the ITF team estimates peak period VKT would rise by 25%. It’s a substantial increase, but much smaller than the 103% jump in the single-passenger taxi scenario discussed above. Not surprisingly, providing public transit service would further mitigate VKT. In a scenario where 22% of trips go by subway, 8% go by foot or bike, and the remaining 70% go by driverless share taxi, the model estimates peak period VKT would rise by a relatively modest 9%.

Taxis serving multiple rather than single passengers would also mean an even smaller taxi fleet would suffice. Fewer cars in the city, kept busy serving dozens of trips a day, would drastically cut the need for parking. Sidewalks and bike lanes would be among the potential uses for the freed-up land. If taxi passengers share rides, and if 22% of trips go by public transit, the ITF figures that close to 95% of all parking spaces in Lisbon could be made redundant. (This outcome depends on traffic still flowing smoothly despite a 9% increase in VKT – if traffic is slowed, a larger taxi fleet would be needed to effectively serve all trips, so more parking would be needed during periods of low demand).

The discussion above just scratches the surface of the ITF and SMART studies – it’s definitely worth reading the original articles to explore their insights and to understand how the models were constructed. Higher-fidelity models that build on the ITF and SMART efforts will improve our estimates of the potential for driverless taxis to serve urban trips; however, even without complex models, it is clear that automation won’t eliminate the need for buses and trains when large numbers of people have to move through limited space. This is one of the straightforward geometric arguments that Jarrett has made before in this blog: larger vehicles fit more people into a given length and width of right-of-way than convoys of small vehicles can carry. (To illustrate, a freeway lane might have a capacity as high as 2400 cars per hour, while Bogotá’s TransMilenio bus rapid transit system has a capacity of 45,000 people per hour per direction.)

Of course, it’s a contentious question when we will attain the holy grail of automation technology sufficiently sophisticated to enable taxis or other vehicles to drive on any road in any conditions. It may appear further in the future than some suppose; nevertheless, even before this “Level 5” technology (as defined by the Society of Automotive Engineers) is mature, there will be vehicles capable of fully automated operation under more restricted conditions. There already are – such “Level 4” vehicles are currently capable of driving themselves at low speeds when segregated from challenging traffic environments. Beginning in the near-term, these kinds of low-speed automated vehicles, perhaps looking something like Google’s famously cute prototype, could carry passengers in settings like retirement communities. They could also circulate through networks of low-speed roads in suburban neighbourhoods or business parks to provide “first and last mile” access to and from transit routes.

ParkShuttle-GRT-vehicles-at-Kralingse-Zoom-stationBoth in the near-term and the long-term, one of the most effective ways to reap the mobility benefits of automation will be to apply it to buses. Even with current technology, driverless operation would be feasible for buses running on busways with adequate exclusion of other vehicles and potential hazards. And even for buses on streets with mixed traffic, some of the technical challenges of achieving full automation are eased. For example, since bus routes run along only a small subset of the larger urban road network, the challenges of building and maintaining exquisitely detailed, meticulously annotated, continually updated maps would be substantially reduced – this would be advantageous for mapping-reliant approaches to automated driving, such as Google’s approach. The drop in labour costs from automation would enable dramatically increased frequencies, and the precision of automated control could also improve reliability. Because of the imminent potential to significantly improve mobility for large numbers of travelers, buses are a key priority for the application of automation.

With Level 5 automation, driverless taxis would become feasible. But rather than usurping the place of buses, they could play a complementary role. Level 5 would of course expand the domain of driverless buses, enabling them to provide service on any road; but it’s simply because buses can move numerous passengers in little road space that they will remain indispensable. Buses could ply heavily traveled corridors; driverless taxis could operate in less dense areas and during periods of lighter travel, whether serving complete trips or feeding into bus and train networks.

Interestingly, since low labour costs for driverless buses would enable higher frequencies, smaller vehicles would suffice to provide effective service in some areas. At a certain point, it could be difficult to distinguish in appearance between a small driverless bus and a driverless share taxi. However, their functions could be distinct: for example, driverless buses could provide frequent, predictable service on fixed routes according to schedules or headways, and driverless share taxis could provide on-demand, flexible route service. On the other hand, because diverting routes to pick up and drop off multiple passengers at numerous origins and destinations would cut into the travel time and cost benefits of taxi travel, some driverless share taxis could end up providing service with more fixed routing.

The take-home message from all this is that it’s critical to strategically deploy vehicle automation technologies according to their strengths and weaknesses. At some point, Level 5 automation will be achieved and driverless taxis will become feasible – but it’s important to think beyond just driverless taxis. To create the best possible mix of urban transportation options, it’s essential to consider the advantages and disadvantages of a range of potential automated vehicles and services – including buses, driverless taxis, and low-speed vehicles. Even more important, there's no need to wait for a Level 5 world with fully-fledged driverless taxis to appear before reaping the benefits of automation – and transit agencies have an opportunity to take the lead.

 [My thoughts on this piece are at the top of the comments! — Jarrett]

Photo: Rotterdam driverless bus prototype, 2getthere.eu 

Do you want me involved in your city’s transit planning?

People often email or tweet to me asking me to "come help" their city.  I really appreciate the sentiment, but I'm not an action hero.  I'm a consultant, and consultants respond to some kind of invitation.

If your city or transit agency is undertaking a transit-related planning project and you'd like me to be involved, please:

  • Tell me about it.  It is extremely difficult for three-person firms like mine to find out about planning projects that could be coming up, because they are advertised in more places than we can possibly keep track of.  Don't assume I know what's coming down the line in your city.  Tell me, using the email button at right.
  • Consider inviting me to speak or run some kind of workshop.  Any organization can do this.  The cost is anywhere from $3000 to $9000 in North America, more overseas, depending mostly on your distance from Portland (Oregon) and what you want me to do.   (Our excellent Senior Associate, Michelle Poyourow, does them for somewhat less.)  This is especially helpful if a project is coming along later that you'd like us to have a shot at.  Many of our major projects, including those Auckland, Houston and Raleigh, were preceded by one or more events I did in that city.  

Our little firm is not networked through the usual industry channels.  We don't belong to the American Public Transit Association, for example, because its dues are simply prohibitive for firms our size.  So we rely on informal networks, social media, and word of mouth to connect us with people and places that could use our help.  So thank you, dear reader, for what you do!

Portland: Frequent Bus Performance Approaching Light Rail’s

Here's an interesting chart:

Tri Met Ops Cost per Ride

This is a year's trend comparing bus and light rail (MAX) service in Portland's transit agency, TriMet, from the performance dashboard at the TriMet Transparency and Accountability Center webpage.  

The metric here is operating cost per boarding ride.  This is a good overall measure of how effectively a transit agency is liberating and moving people, where down means good.  (I prefer this ratio upside down: ridership per unit cost or "bang for buck," so that up means good. but this is obviously a chart by finance people who always want cost on top.)  This is a "macro" metric.  Practically everything a transit agency does affects it, so it's lousy diagnosis but not bad if you only have bandwidth to convey one measure.

Most American transit data just compares bus and rail, and inevitably shows bus performing worse.  You'll see that here too if you just look at the wide solid lines.  From this we get endless ignorant journalism lamenting the poor performance of the city bus, as though all city buses are basically alike.

What if we separated out highly useful and liberating bus service as a separate category?  That isn't exactly the distinction made here but it's close.  TriMet's Frequent Service network (still being restored, but mostly now back in existence) is the network of all services that are almost always coming soon.  

This chart says two remarkable things:

  • Frequent bus performance is now very close to light rail performance.   
  • The spread between Frequent Bus and infrequent bus is usually bigger than the spread between all buses and light rail.

The lesson is pretty clear:  The "city bus" is a misleading category, and the much-fetishized difference between bus and rail may matter less than whether the services are designed to be useful.  And when it comes to usefulness, no one variable capture that more than frequency.  

How do the network changes affect your trip?

Here's a great way to help people understand how a transit service change or project will affect them.

Houston METRO has released a new tool to help people understand the upcoming major changes to the city's transit system. It puts two trip planners side-by-side: one routing via routes in the existing network, the other via the routes of the New Bus Network

Screen Shot 2015-06-02 at 10.31.56 AM

Houston's transit network is about to change dramatically, and everyone is going to have to learn how to use the new one.This lets anybody quickly compare different trips trips to see both how a trip will go in the new system, and how long it will take.  It could be a great educational tool in the public consultation phase, not just when implementation is occurring.

It can also make the tradeoffs implied in the system redesign explicit. For example, in the trip above, a grid movement in southeast Houston is now much faster due to the reduced waiting times on frequent network routes in the area. Other transit systems implementing major changes would do well to build similar apps.

However, while the dual trip planner is great for understanding how the changes effect specific trips, it is less useful for developing a sense of how the overall mobility level changes across the city with the new network. As an extension of this same idea, a companion tool could be developed that would compare the transit isochrones of different points in Houston in the existing and new networks. Not only would a person be able to understand how specific trips from one point to another change, but how the area of the city (and all of the opportunities located within it) accessible by transit changes as well.

No, Let’s Not “Uber” Our Bus System

Have you just read another article claiming that public transit would be better off if we unleashed private innovation?  Ask whether they're talking about privatized operations or privatized planning.  These are totally different things, but it's currently fashionable to confuse them.

Graduate student August Ruhnka, writing in the Denver Post, is the latest in a series.  After reviewing the real cost and quality control issues plaguing US bus systems, he goes on to propose a fatal confusion between privatization of operations and privatization of planning.

The remedy is simple. The city awards a route bus contract after a competitive bidding process, thus entering into a private/public partnership.

So far so good.  This is the standard model of privatized operation.  But then, OMG:

By privatizing our bus system's day-to-day operations while still providing public oversight, private operators will be able to change routes, schedules and fares as frequently as necessary without the need for lengthy public hearings and political approval.

"Change routes, schedules, and fares?"  This is the privatization of planning.  It features the abolition of "political approval," which is a polite term for the abolition of democratic controls over spending the public purse.   It's also produced some of the worst bus systems — in terms of both disutility and waste — that I've ever encountered in 23 years doing network planning.  Ruhnka goes on:

Today, successful privately operated transit projects like the Sydney Metropolitan Bus System, Hudson-Bergen Line in New Jersey and the JFK Air Train in New York are chugging away.

Only one of these examples is even a bus service, where route changes are an issue, and none of them are examples of the privatization of planning that Rohnka proposes.   They are all examples of privatized operations.  

The Sydney example is more apt than Rohnka knows.  Planning was controlled by private operating companies over much of Australia and New Zealand when I started working there in 2006.  Now, all over both countries, planning is being moved back into the public sector, while operations remain private. That's happening, in part, because transit planning by operating companies produced fantastically inefficient bus systems such as the one in Auckland, New Zealand, which I have been helping the new Auckland Transport to redesign.  

The problem was not just privatization but turf.  Private companies who control just certain bus routes may optimize their own bus routes, but that doesn't optimize the whole taxpayer funded network and can in fact make it worse.  (The same problem can afflict turf-bound governments, of course, but turning them over to the private sector does nothing to solve that problem, while it does remove our ability to hold elected officials accountable for it.)

In cities across the world, major bus corridors are becoming important redevelopment areas.  Bus service has a huge nexus with a range of important government activities, notably road design and land use planning.  To give up control over the design of bus services is to give up control that's needed to do those jobs well.

Public hearings are a drag, and the approval process for bus service changes in America is exhausting for both elected officials and the public.  Preparing for this process is central to every project I do.  My job is to help elected officials (or their appointees) make clear decisions about the real tradeoffs that transit planning requires.  These are hard choices that must reflect a city's ambitions and values, and that must be linked to a city's decisions about land use, urban form, and social policy.

All these thoughts are supposed to give way, of course, to the romantic idea that we could "Uber" our bus system.  

In light of our Uber-dominated downtown, it is time for us to make this switch. Private-route contracts establish a sustainable procedure to constantly test the market to achieve the lowest cost. Commuting in downtown Denver requires three things that currently RTD lacks: demand-response (paratransit) operation; experimental services; and remedying routes that have low ridership. All the above situations require a level of flexibility that the private sector can provide.

Uber is big and new and financed and sexy, so how could this not be better than our old bus services?   (A dismissive view of  "political approval," too, is part of the Uber mystique.)

Uber today is a taxi and (limited) shared ride service using small vehicles to carry small numbers of people at once.   Assuming you pay the driver decently (a big assumption in the private sector) the cost-effectiveness of transit is going to lie in passengers per driver, because pending driverless vehicles, the driver is most of the cost.  And the only way to get that number high is to run large vehicles in fixed-route services that are so well designed, and optimized over so many purposes, that lots of people ride them.   The Uber model does not scale to large-vehicle fixed-route transit, which is also known as cost-effective transit.  

Why, then, does downtown Denver require "demand-responsive operation"?  Downtowns are big, dense, and need to use street space efficiently, so large vehicles are the key.  Compared to big buses with decent ridership, demand-responsive service is a way of carrying very few people at a high cost.    There is no way that a demand-responsive solution, in a place where fixed routes could work just as well, makes any sense as a way to make transit affordable to low-income people, one of Ruhnka's alleged concerns.  Affordability is scalability.  If a solution doesn't scale efficiently — in terms of labor cost, energy, and urban space, it will naturally be expensive.  

So to the extent that some people think they need a demand-responsive service downtown (apart from paratransit for the disabled) by all means let Uber and Lyft do that.  Demand-responsive is such an intrinsically inefficient form of transit that deploying it downtown can only be for the purpose of serving relatively fortunate people at fares much higher than transit fares.  That's a great role for the private sector.  There is also a role for demand responsive service in suburban areas where development patterns preclude efficient transit, through contracts between demand responsive providers and transit agencies.  But not downtown.

Another way of describing all of the "demand responsive" or "Uberization" fantasies is that they are predicated on moving large amounts of steel and rubber per customer trip, compared to big-vehicle fixed-route transit.  Even without considering the economics of labor, this can only be less efficient, in terms of energy and urban space, then what crowded big-vehicle transit achieves.  (And yes, you've probably read that a lot of big buses run around empty, as though this means that buses are a poor tool.  The refutation of that argument is here, and here.)

Transit is full of opportunities for private sector involvement, including in operations, infrastructure, and my own job, professional advice.  The private sector is always welcome to innovate, and there are markets — generally for higher-end services and higher fares — that the private sector will probably take over.  There are also fascinating opportunities to use Uber/Lyft models to improve the efficiency of services to low-demand areas — that will require partnership with suburban communities or transit agencies.

But privatize planning?  Let private companies re-arrange transit services without regard to the impact on the city and its values?  That's the opposite of democracy.

Quote of the week: bike-bus conflicts

On the inevitable problem of curb bike lanes interacting with bus stops:

Generally, transit advocates are also bike advocates, but with regular on-street bike lanes, this conflict point becomes an unavoidable ally-versus-ally battle … As a bicyclist, I am constantly on the lookout for oncoming buses even when I’m in a bike lane. As a transit rider, the mere seconds delay to wait for a biker can cause my bus to miss a traffic signal, which can cause me to miss my transfer, which can cause me to arrive 15 minutes late to work on the day where a coworker brought in Mel-O-Glaze Donuts, which can then cause me to be donut-less for the whole morning. Like, I said, none of this is good.

Chris Iverson at the Minneapolis blog streets.mn

This came across my email just as I'd finished a meeting about a bike vs bus lane problem on Auckland's Karangahape Road.  The interaction of curb-running bicycles and bus stops is a problem on every continent and island, because it's a geometry problem.

And that means, chill!  Obviously, we push back on anyone who says that either bikes or buses are "just more important" than the other; that's just tribalism.  But then you accept the difficulty and the unsatisfactoriness of any compromise, including the one Chris proposes, the "floating bus stop" shown here in an image from the NACTO Street Design Guidelines:

Seattle_unknown_21

This works fine as long as the bus stop isn't busy, but of course there are likely to be lots of pedestrians crossing the bike lane at the times when the bus is stopped there, so a cyclist's odds of actually passing a stopped bus on the curb side may be limited.  I also prefer "table" or shared space solutions for the bike lane that alert the cyclist to yield to peds in this situation.  

Is it perfect?  No, but there isn't a perfect solution.  We know that geometrically, so: chill!